

The virus which has been going around the city struck me down in the middle of last week, thus I could not go. I am very glad, however, that my former administrative assistant, Mr. Merrell F. Small, read the partial text which I had prepared, and also spoke from notes which were furnished to him by my office on some of the issues which I considered to be of interest to the newspaper profession in my State.

I ask unanimous consent that the partial text of my comments be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

PARTIAL TEXT OF REMARKS BY U.S. SENATOR THOMAS H. KUCHEL, PRESENTED TO THE CALIFORNIA NEWSPAPER PUBLISHERS ASSOCIATION'S CONVENTION, EL DORADO HOTEL, SACRAMENTO, CALIF., FEBRUARY 4, 1965

We are confronted in Washington with a series of messages and recommendations from the President and from the concept of what he has called the Great Society. No one should cavil at the high goals which he has set forth for us. All of us hope for better life and learning for our youth, and for happier days for all our people, whose lifespan is lengthening through the marvels of medicine and science. All of us agree that poverty ought to be fought, and that disease and illiteracy are bad, and that our free society, and its system of free enterprise represent the best form of society which we intend to keep and to improve. There is a real question of the prodigious amount of money involved in all this, and at what rate, in all the many fields the President covered, we should seek to proceed toward their attainment. A rule of reason needs to be applied respecting levels of public expenditures, for fiscal integrity in our Federal Government must be attained.

I wish to point out that however good life is, or may be, in the United States, the globe is not ours alone. The vagaries of mankind, and the paths which other nations may follow, bear strongly and directly upon what kind of living may be our own lot.

The \$50 billion we shall again appropriate for the next fiscal year for our military is not to promote the welfare of our country, but rather to help its preservation. We intend to maintain a military superiority to deter potential aggression against us, or, if necessary, to combat it.

The moneys our Government spends abroad are intended for our own security, and for advancing, if that is possible, toward a decent and just peace.

But, since evil and lust for power are not going suddenly to evaporate, the administration has a firm and continuing duty to exert itself in matters of defense and foreign policy, indeed, to lead, with vigor and courage, all the free nation-states against a growing number of potential pitfalls, many of which they themselves create, and most of the rest of which come from the trickery and treachery of international communism.

The other day, a prominent Paris newspaper suggested that President Johnson's illness was faked in order to avoid meetings with international leaders attending the funeral for Sir Winston Churchill in London. That is an ugly charge, and a false one, unworthy of a great newspaper. The President was ill and he should not have gone overseas. Its falsity can best be proved by the President and his administration exerting a leadership, in American foreign policy, through all the techniques of diplomacy and statesmanship, among all nations who, with us, aim to keep their freedom and integrity. The security of America, including such progress as we hope reasonably to make,

rests on a foreign policy which successfully meets the flow of dangers as they emanate from international communism and elsewhere.

The fact is that this world of ours is full of trouble. There is considerable peril in almost every corner of the globe, and very little of it seems to be on the wane.

A war is being fought in the Indochinese Peninsula and it involves the United States. Under General Eisenhower, we responded to a call from the Government of South Vietnam for "advice and assistance" and it is generally conceded that, in the intervening years, that phrase has been rather liberally construed by our own Government. Religious, political, and personal differences among the South Vietnamese people have produced constant instability in their Government, which has changed hands so often as to raise serious doubts on their capacity to unite even in defense of their homeland. Unity of their own leaders in the formation of a government with some stability is an indispensable prerequisite to the protection and to the integrity of their homeland. The Vietcong, from the north, abetted by the infamous Marxist regime of Red China, yearn for the day when all of this Asian peninsula will fall to the Reds. If they would let their non-Communist neighbors live in peace, there would be very little trouble, and some kind of a peace could ensue in this beleaguered area. But Marxist communism does not work that way. Decades and generations—perhaps centuries—are of small moment in their strategic planning. Life, to them, is hardly an expensive commodity. And now, the announced visit of a Soviet delegation, led by its Premier, to North Vietnam adds new mystery and foreboding to the danger.

However much Americans may wish to debate the wisdom of our original response to a cry for help, the fact is we did respond and we are present—to "advise and assist"—and I can now see no honorable means for us abruptly to abandon the South Vietnamese peoples as some in the Congress and the country now demand. I see no useful purpose in now arguing whether we should have agreed, years ago, to assist South Vietnam. The fact is we did agree and we are there. The sanctity of America's word, of her response to a plea for help, raises a question of honor when some among us urge our Government to pull out. Friends who trust us must not be disillusioned, and our enemies and potential enemies must recognize that America does not run away from danger.

I like what Dean Acheson said in a recent speech at Amherst College. We have a duty "to preserve values outside the contour of our own skins, and at the expense of foregoing much that is desired and pleasant, including—it may be—our own fortunes and lives."

Of all the worries which plague us, I think one of the most grievous is that which we and some of our historic friends have themselves brought upon us. Churchill spoke about the need for close collaboration among the English-speaking countries. How true. And among our historic friends and allies in Western Europe, we, over here, have fondly hoped that, some day, they would become the United States of Europe. That day has not arrived. But we have had, in the Second World War, and in the subsequent years of uneasy peace, a Western alliance, a collective military interdependence of free democracies, agreeing that an attack against one of them would be treated as an attack against all of us. And since the North Atlantic Treaty Organization came into being, Red inroads in Europe have come to a halt.

Much progress has been achieved in the Atlantic Community. Yet, perhaps partly because of such progress, this achievement is now faced with great danger. Why should this be so? The Communist danger has not disappeared. That communism shows its

greatest impact now in Asia and Africa, where Western unity is either nonexistent or much less in evidence than in Europe, ought to reawaken us to the very value of that unity. And it is also true that the rise of emerging nations confronts the entire Western World with common problems which we could resolve far better by a common effort. History seems to disclose that trouble flows most freely when the West is disunited.

What has happened to this great alliance? Why is it suddenly in such disarray?

Some fainthearted critics have told us that this alliance was forged in the days when America was supreme and Europe lay prostrate; but now, we are told, Europe wants to be on her own. Hence, they say this alliance is outdated. To many, this appears to make sense on first impact, but if we take the trouble to cut through the verbiage and look at facts, not fiction, a quite different picture emerges.

True, there is criticism here and there, and there are various suggestions for improvements. Obviously, changes should be made in an alliance created over 15 years ago. But it is equally true that neither in Great Britain, nor in Germany, nor in Italy, nor in the Benelux countries nor Scandinavia, is there a demand for fundamental change or renunciation of NATO. None of them desires the United States to be less active in the common defense of the West, or less of a participant in NATO, though they do desire a stronger voice in the common weal. We should be ready, indeed, active, to seek ways of achieving this.

Only one country appears to seek the dissolution of NATO and the withdrawal of America from Europe. That country is France. And even there, many of France's citizens and nearly all of the great newspapers are opposed to the policy of their government.

Last New Year's Eve, General de Gaulle addressed the people of France, and spoke of "rejecting all systems which, under the guise of 'supranational,' or of 'integration,' or else of 'Atlanticism' systems which would actually maintain us under the hegemony of which you know."

If these words mean what I am afraid they mean, then our long-time friends, the gallant French people, under de Gaulle's leadership, may not long remain in an integrated system of defense among the Atlantic nations.

France is an independent, sovereign country. If she were to choose to leave the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, we cannot stop her.

But we, too are an independent, sovereign Nation, and so are our allies. While we cannot stop France, France cannot stop us or those in the Western alliance who agree with us in our wish to make lasting arrangements for the common defense of like-minded members of the Atlantic area.

The situation cries out for leadership, and leadership will come from the United States, or it will not come at all. Should we look to the United Kingdom, whose government was elected with a razor-thin majority, and which is beset with many problems? Will leadership come from Germany, or from Italy? Surely, there can be no question. It is the Government of the United States which will supply the leadership, if any there be, or the disarray of NATO will give way to disintegration and demise.

VIETNAM

Mr. KUCHEL. Mr. President, on last Thursday I said:

A war is being fought in the Indochinese Peninsula and it involves the United States. Under General Eisenhower, we responded to a call from the Government of South Vietnam for "advice and assistance" and it is generally conceded that, in the intervening

years, that phrase has been rather liberally construed by our own Government. Religious, political, and personal differences among the South Vietnamese people have produced constant instability in their government, which has changed hands so often as to raise serious doubts on their capacity to unite even in defense of their homeland. Unity of their own leaders in the formation of a government with some stability is an indispensable prerequisite to the protection and to the integrity of their homeland. The Vietcong, from the north, abetted by the infamous Marxist regime of Red China, yearn for the day when all of this Asian Peninsula will fall to the Reds. If they would let their non-Communist neighbors live in peace, there would be very little trouble, and some kind of a peace could ensue in this beleaguered area. But Marxist communism does not work that way. Decades and generations—perhaps centuries—are of small moment in their strategic planning. Life, to them, is hardly an expensive commodity.

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I like what Dean Acheson said in a recent speech at Amherst College. We have a duty “to preserve values outside the contour of our own skins, and at the expense of foregoing much that is desired and pleasant, including—it may be—our own fortunes and lives.”

Yesterday at the request of the wire services, I made a statement reading as follows:

There is yet time for communism to halt this frightful adventure. Whether anyone likes it or not, America is in South Vietnam as her request, to help her preserve her independence.

It is an independence grounded on the agreement in which the Soviet Union itself participated.

And we are not going to be driven out nor run away. America's purpose is clear, and communism must not misunderstand us. Otherwise, the Reds in Asia—maybe elsewhere—could mistakenly ignite a fire to destroy far more than they bargained for. I completely approve our immediate response to the new, enlarged sneak attack of the Vietcong. Why the sneak attack was successful at all remains to be answered.

I must add, as a Senator who speaks as an American in this Chamber, and not as a political partisan, that the question of why the sneak attack was successful at all remains a problem to be answered by the appropriate committees of the Senate.

STOCKPILE INVESTIGATION

Mr. ROBERTSON. Mr. President, tomorrow the Senate will have before it S. 28, a bill to provide for the sale, eventually, of all surplus stockpiled materials, which had a cost price of about about \$8½ billion.

The Subcommittee on National Stockpile and Naval Petroleum Reserves of the Senate Armed Services Committee started its stockpile investigation on February 23, 1962 for the purpose of recovering unconscionable profits from producers who contracted to sell strategic and critical materials to the Government.

In a press conference on June 1, 1962, the chairman of the Subcommittee on National Stockpile and Naval Petroleum Reserves stated that as of that date his subcommittee had established that the taxpayers stand to lose \$1 billion as a result of these stockpile operations. He further stated:

We have also established the fact that much of this loss is because of maladministration or inefficiency in the handling of the program.

Although I am not aware of any report on the recovery of unconscionable profits, the subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee and the full committee have voted out a bill, S. 28, which cuts across the legislative jurisdiction of the Banking and Currency Committee, the Agricultural and Forestry Committee, and the Finance Committee.

The Banking and Currency Committee has legislative jurisdiction over the Defense Production Act inventory of materials, and this inventory has been subject to continuing review by the Joint Committee on Defense Production. S. 28 seeks to transfer all authority over the Defense Production Act inventory to the Subcommittee on National Stockpile and Naval Petroleum Reserves and to bypass the Banking and Currency Committee.

S. 28 proposes to transfer materials in the Defense Production Act inventory to a new materials reserve inventory if not required to meet current stockpile objectives. Also, materials hereafter acquired under the provisions of the Defense Production Act which are not needed to meet stockpile objectives of the national stockpile would be placed in the materials reserve inventory. The Banking and Currency Committee would be required to relinquish its authority over the Defense Production Act inventory to the Armed Services Committee.

Notes representing the acquisition costs of materials so transferred, together with unpaid interest thereon, would be canceled, and the borrowing authority under section 304(b) of the Defense Production Act would be correspondingly reduced. The waiver of interest and the cancellation of notes under the borrowing authority of title III of the Defense Production Act has been the subject of discussion in 1964, 1962, and earlier. Approval of such waivers and cancellation has been denied.

Materials in the Defense Production Act inventory may not be sold at less than the current domestic market price. In 1962 it was proposed to eliminate the word “domestic” from this provision of the Defense Production Act. However, the proposal was not adopted. S. 28 provides for the sale of materials in the materials reserve inventory at “fair market value” but provides that “fair market value” shall be construed to mean not less than the current domestic market price unless the President shall determine that such a construction is inconsistent with the purposes of the act.

There is no requirement in the Defense Production Act for any delay in selling materials acquired under that act. The timing of a sale is entirely within the discretion of the agencies administering the act. S. 28 would impose on sales from the new materials reserve inventory, and consequently on all materials in the Defense Production Act inventory, a requirement of at least 60 days' delay, and would subject them to veto by resolution of the Senate or the House.

In extending the Defense Production Act, the Banking and Currency Committee expressly recommended continuance of sections 302, 303, and 304 to continue available to the executive the means for quick and decisive action to meet a materials supply problem in a new emergency. If materials acquired for this purpose are made subject to the 60-day waiting period imposed by section 7 of S. 28, the purpose of the program would be frustrated.

The basic responsibility of the Armed Services Committee, as related to materials, is to determine what is needed in the stockpile for defense purposes. The Banking and Currency Committee has responsibility for economic measures, stabilization, and controls. Surplus supplies of materials which are to be offered for sale in the civilian economy should be under the jurisdiction of the Banking and Currency Committee.

S. 28 appears to be similar to a proposed bill which originated in the General Services Administration and was circulated among Government agencies long before the subcommittee started its stockpiling hearings. This may explain why the policymaking functions of the Office of Emergency Planning are being transferred to the housekeeping agency of the Government, the General Services Administration. The Office of Emergency Planning, which has special skills and knowledge as to the needs of the military and of the civilian economy for defense and mobilization purposes, and the Department of Commerce, would be entirely bypassed.

As early as January 1955, the Joint Committee on Defense Production reviewed the procedures being followed in the administration of materials contracts and recommended that GSA review the records of individuals within GSA who failed to carry out assigned duties and to properly safeguard the interest of the Government. There is a case in court at the present time involv-

ment district. The local contributions for administrative expenses may be in cash or in kind, fairly evaluated, including but not limited to space, equipment, and services; and

(2) either directly or through arrangements with appropriate public or private organizations, to provide funds for investigation, research, studies, and demonstration projects, but not for construction purposes, which will further the purposes of this Act.

(b) Not to exceed \$11,000,000 of this Act, authorized in section 16 of this Act shall be available to carry out this section.

ANNUAL REPORT

SEC. 17. Not later than six months after the close of each fiscal year, each Secretary of an executive department administering any program under this Act shall prepare and submit to the Governor of each State and to the President, for transmittal to the Congress, a report on the activities carried out under this Act during such year.

AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS

SEC. 18. In addition to the appropriations authorized in section 3 for the economic development highways, there is hereby authorized to be appropriated for the period ending June 30, 1967, to be available until expended, not to exceed \$185,000,000 to carry out this Act.

APPLICABLE LABOR STANDARDS

SEC. 19. All laborers and mechanics employed by contractors or subcontractors in the construction, alteration, or repair, including painting and decorating, of projects, buildings, and works which are financially assisted through the Federal funds authorized under this Act, shall be paid wages at rates not less than those prevailing on similar construction in the locality as determined by the Secretary of Labor in accordance with the Davis-Bacon Act, as amended (40 U.S.C. 276a-276a-8). The Secretary of Labor shall have with respect to such labor standards, the authority and functions set forth in Reorganization Plan Numbered 14 of 1950 (16 F.R. 3176, 64 Stat. 1267, 5 U.S.C. 133-133z-15), and section 2 of the Act of June 13, 1934, as amended (48 Stat. 948, as amended; 40 U.S.C. 276(c)).

DEFINITION OF ELIGIBLE AREA

SEC. 20. As used in this Act, the term "eligible area" shall have the same meaning as is given it in section 3(a) of the Public Works Acceleration Act (76 Stat. 541).

SEVERABILITY

SEC. 21. If any provision of this Act, or the applicability thereof to any person or circumstance, is held invalid, the remainder of this Act, and the application of such provision to other persons or circumstances, shall not be affected thereby.

TERMINATION

SEC. 22. This Act shall cease to be in effect on July 1, 1971.

THE NEED FOR A U.S. FOREIGN POLICY IN VIETNAM

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under previous order of the House, the gentleman from New York [Mr. LINDSAY] is recognized for 1 hour.

(Mr. LINDSAY asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. LINDSAY. Mr. Speaker, the President must define our policy in Vietnam. It is still apparent that we have no clear policy except an aimless patchwork of scotch tape and baffling wire that becomes more confused every day. It should not be necessary, I suppose, to express our shock and dismay over the

widening American bloodshed. But we need not be taken for fools in accepting without further explanation that this is permitted in the name of "stability." Stability of what? A series of cabals and cliques that defy stability and have no base of support in the country other than our own military backup? If there is any element of American political prestige in addition to the military it is declining very rapidly. Stabilize the area with what then? More mortars and guns that eventually are turned against us? Or with more inspection tours by four star generals thereby again leaving the impression that the full military might of the United States is committed, which is neither true nor desirable.

There will be, from now on, more strikes and counter strikes until the little remaining cover is totally stripped away and the involvement that is euphemistically known as military support becomes a naked U.S. war that has neither front lines nor back lines, nor beginning or ending, nor commitment by the very people we seek to defend.

I am not suggesting, Mr. Speaker, that we pick up and walk out of Vietnam tomorrow morning. Obviously such a petulant act, born out of anger and frustration, would at this point have giant repercussions in the chain of anti-Communist defense running the loop from India and Pakistan, to Malaysia and the Philippines to Australia, Formosa and Japan. The Oriental notion of "face" is not to be taken lightly. And even our friends who think we are fools agree that we have got ourselves sufficiently frozen in to be incapable of immediate extrication.

I do suggest, however, that heads of state display some willingness to communicate with each other—some energetic commonsense—in order to prevent this miserable war from unnecessarily enmeshing the entire globe in a conflict of arms. The initiative must come from the President of the United States, for no one else can or will take the lead.

This initiative, Mr. Speaker, should include a report to the Congress and the country, by the President, defining our policy in this area, its purpose and its proposal for a political solution, the means by which a halt—even temporary—to military operations can be achieved, and what measures interested nations should be prepared to undertake on a collective basis to guarantee the independence of the area.

VOTING RIGHTS BILL OF 1965

Mr. LINDSAY. Now, Mr. Speaker, I wish to change to an entirely different subject on domestic policy and speak for just a moment on the problem of voting rights in the United States and civil rights legislation in that regard. A group of Republican Members of the House have joined me this afternoon in introducing a comprehensive bill designed to fill in the gaps that have been demonstrated to exist in legislation that is now part of the United States Code and which relates to the responsibility that the Federal Government has in the area of voting rights.

Members will recall that it was during

the Eisenhower administration that key legislation was developed, submitted to the Congress and passed, under which the right to vote is guaranteed, and that right is implemented.

In 1960 the Congress passed a Civil Rights Act affecting voting rights which established a procedure under which the Attorney General and the Department of Justice may apply to a U.S. court for a finding of a pattern or practice of voting denials in any area. The court then, under existing law, listens to the argument on both sides between the U.S. Government and local registrars of voting and makes a decision. All due process is met. In the event that the court should find that a pattern or practice of voting denial exists, the court is empowered under existing law to appoint referees, or himself to order registered persons denied registration by the local registrar. This was good and sound legislation. It was adjusted slightly in the Civil Rights Act of 1964 through voting provisions that had been suggested, I may say, by many of us on the minority side of the Judiciary Committee. It is demonstrated now, however, that in the United States it is still too difficult for qualified persons to gain the right to vote where they have not had it before. No one can deny the facts that have been stated and restated to the effect that there are too many areas in the United States where no Negro citizens are registered to vote at all.

I would like to add that this problem is one that is not confined necessarily to any one particular part of the country and it should not be regarded as a sectional issue. It is a U.S. issue and one that all U.S. Congressmen as U.S. Congressmen have the duty to pay some attention to.

This bill that is submitted today by several of us, including at least two Members on the minority side of the House Committee on the Judiciary, is a proposal which is sound, carefully worked out, feasible, practical, fair, reasonable, and which I think will work. What it does in effect is to give the executive branch of the U.S. Government the power to take the initiative in setting in motion the procedure for registering persons who allege that they have been denied the right to vote in any case where a Federal court is slow to act or negligent in the conduct of its responsibilities.

What the bill does in effect is, or will be, to force a court to take a position. Where a court finds that 50 or more qualified citizens in a voting district have been denied the right to vote, the Federal court must find a pattern or practice of discrimination. If it finds such pattern or practice, the court shall appoint one or more Federal registrars to register citizens similarly situated within the area who have been denied the right to vote. If the court fails to make the finding or fails to appoint registrars within 40 days, the President shall do so if he receives certified statements under oath from 50 qualified citizens in the area that they have been denied the right to vote.

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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

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communications and the use of communications satellites;

- (8) Federal power matters;
- (9) civil aeronautics;
- (10) fisheries and wildlife;
- (11) marine sciences; and
- (12) Weather Bureau operations and planning, including the use of weather satellites.

Sec. 2. For the purposes of this resolution the committee, from February 1, 1965, to January 31, 1966, inclusive, is authorized (1) to make such expenditures as it deems advisable; (2) to employ, upon a temporary basis, technical, clerical, and other assistants and consultants: *Provided*, That the minority is authorized to select one person for appointment, and the person so selected shall be appointed and his compensation shall be so fixed that his gross rate shall not be less by more than \$2,100 than the highest gross rate paid to any other employee; and (3) with the prior consent of the heads of the departments or agencies concerned, and the Committee on Rules and Administration, to utilize the reimbursable services, information, facilities, and personnel of any of the departments or agencies of the Government.

Sec. 3. The committee shall report its findings, together with its recommendations for legislation as it deems advisable, to the Senate at the earliest practicable date, but not later than January 31, 1966.

Sec. 4. Expenses of the committee, under this resolution, which shall not exceed \$442,700, shall be paid from the contingent fund of the Senate upon vouchers approved by the chairman of the committee.

IMMIGRATION REFORM NEEDED NOW

Mr. WILLIAMS of New Jersey. Mr. President, the second sentence of the Declaration of Independence contains the following words, "All men are created equal."

These five words say more about the principles behind the founding and growth of this great country of ours than any other five in the English language. These few words explain our insistence on justice for all; these few words are in the definition of freedom. Because of these words, great people from the world over have come to the United States and helped to make our greatness a lasting thing. Through wars, both civil and foreign, through peace, both firm and shaky, these few words have endured as our guiding light.

For the past 44 years, we have told people in many nations that we no longer practice what we preach; that we no longer believe in the words of our Declaration of Independence; that we have, in fact, betrayed the principles that have made this country the greatest in the world. We have been saying, in effect, that if we were born in northern and western Europe we are more equal than someone born in southern and eastern Europe; but if we were born in southeastern Europe we are, nevertheless, more equal than those born in Asia or Africa. This could not be further from the truth, and I believe that the time has come to reconcile our actions with our beliefs. It is time we take a serious look at our immigration policies and once and for all put an end to the discriminatory practices we have employed since 1921.

We are very fortunate to have before us a bill that will help to do exactly that. The bill, S. 500, was introduced by the distinguished Senator from Michigan [Mr. HART]. It is similar to the legislation urged by the late President Kennedy and given priority by President Johnson. In general, this piece of proposed legislation will do away with discrimination against applications for immigration visas on the grounds of national origin.

While the bill does not open the gates to all aliens applying for immigration, it does so drastically modify the present immigration regulations so as to do away with the injustice and waste created by our present regulations. While the present national quota on immigration of 158,361 will only be increased by less than 7,000, far more people will enter the United States, new citizens who can be of great service to the country.

The bill will take the total number of quota numbers and divide them into three classifications. The first classification will consist of 50 percent of the numbers. Persons falling into this classification will be those who in the opinion of the Attorney General of the United States will be "especially advantageous" to the country.

The second classification will be 30 percent of the total quota numbers and will be issued to unmarried sons and daughters of U.S. citizens who are not eligible for nonquota preference because they are over 21 years of age.

The third classification will consist of the remaining 20 percent of the quota numbers, with preference issued to spouses and unmarried sons and daughters of aliens admitted to this country for permanent residence; and, finally, to other miscellaneous applications for immigration.

There are two good aspects of the bill that are definitely worthy of mention. Under the proposed reforms, every country is limited to 10 percent of the quota numbers in each classification. If, after 10 months of the year, it is apparent that all the numbers in a given classification will not be used in the year, the 10-percent ban can be lifted to allow the full use of the quotas allocated. There is a great deal of wisdom in such a proposal. All too often, the quota numbers given an individual country under the present system are unused, but the visa applications in another country may far outnumber the quota numbers available. Under the proposed system, surplus quota numbers can be shifted to another country to meet particular demands, thus making it possible for deserving individuals to immigrate to the United States when otherwise they would be unable to do so. The 10-percent ban also prevents one country from monopolizing the quota numbers to the exclusion of other countries.

Under the proposed system, citizens from all countries would have equal opportunity to immigrate to this country regardless of the geographical location of their country. It seems to me that this system is only fair and right and is in keeping with the American tradition.

The other stipulation that makes S. 500 an outstanding bill is the clause that permits unused quota numbers in one classification to be transferred for use in the next lower classification. Again we see a provision that will eliminate the waste of quota numbers that exists under our present laws and makes the structure of the quota regulations far more flexible.

In summation, the administration bill will make it far more possible for highly qualified foreign citizens to immigrate to the United States, do away with our present discriminatory practices, and assure the fullest use of the quota numbers available. In addition, the refugee reform provisions in the bill will make it easier for people who are fleeing from tyranny to be welcomed to the United States as refugees.

All of us in the Senate have sponsored private bills for individuals wishing to immigrate to the United States and are fully aware of the great inequities of our present immigration laws. We are fully cognizant of the heartache and dashed hopes that surround most immigration cases with which we must deal. With full knowledge of the present inadequacies, I say the time has come to act.

The bill introduced by the Senator from Michigan [Mr. HART] will help to eliminate the hypocrisy of our position and let the world know that the United States is a country settled by immigrants, brought to greatness by immigrants, and is still a country that welcomes immigrants regardless of their national origin. Let us again say with pride, "all men are created equal."

Mr. President, as a cosponsor of S. 500, I urge every Member of this body to give the bill his most careful consideration and join me in helping to pass this urgently needed legislation.

MATERIALS RESERVE AND STOCK-PILE ACT OF 1965

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I move that the Senate proceed to the consideration of Senate bill 28, which was reported today.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill will be stated for the information of the Senate.

The CHIEF CLERK. A bill (S. 28) to insure the availability of certain critical materials during a war or national emergency by providing for a reserve of such materials, and for other purposes.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, no action will be taken on this bill today, but it will be the pending business as soon as the morning hour is completed tomorrow.

ORDER FOR ADJOURNMENT UNTIL TOMORROW

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that when the Senate concludes its business today, it adjourn to meet at 12 o'clock noon tomorrow.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

THE MESS IN VIETNAM

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, the tragic events in Vietnam over the week-end should give all Americans reason to pause and call for a reassessment of our position in South Vietnam.

It is, of course, difficult to have such reassessment until all the facts concerning the latest events have been made known. Hopefully they will, although judging by past experience on the manner in which the news from South Vietnam has been managed, it is doubtful whether the American public will be made privy to the full details of what is actually transpiring in Vietnam.

The past management of the news from Vietnam is well set out in a very comprehensive article by James A. Wechsler in the *Progressive* for February 1965 entitled "Vietnam: A Study in Deception."

Mr. Wechsler's judgment is:

But whatever place the Vietnam involvement may occupy in our military annals, it has already become a classic case history in the uses—and misuses—of Government deception to sustain a course that deserved the fullest national awareness and debate.

I ask unanimous consent that Mr. Wechsler's excellent article be printed in full in the *Record* at the conclusion of my remarks.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit No. 1.)

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, much of the news thus far released from South Vietnam, the Pentagon, and the White House raises many more questions than it answers.

The reasons for the tragic loss of American men killed and wounded in the Vietcong attack on Pleiku cannot be glossed over by Secretary McNamara saying:

The fact is that the attack was carried out in the dead of night; it was a sneak attack. It's typical of guerrilla operations. It's the kind of attack that it's almost impossible to provide effective security against. I think it's the type of attack we must expect more of in this type of war.

The facts as published to date indicate a deplorable lack of effective security precautions. We are engaged in a war in South Vietnam—an undeclared war, to be sure—but a war in any event. The rules of war do not limit the fighting to the daylight hours between the hours of 9 to 5. Nor do the rules of the war require that the enemy give us a certain number of hours advance notice before attacking. That is true whether it is a conventional war or a guerrilla war. Secretary McNamara cannot gloss over the lack of security at Pleiku by attributing our losses to a "sneak" attack which we must expect because we are fighting a guerrilla war. Indeed Secretary McNamara's "sneak attack" characterization may well deserve the award of the silliest statement of the year, if not in the whole history of statements from the Pentagon. The warriors there will know that surprise is an essential concomitant of military action in war.

Apparently we have learned little about security since the destructive attack on the Bien Hoa airbase 2 months ago.

The time is long past due for a full scale inquiry into security precautions and the lack of them in South Vietnam. The people of the United States have a right to know why security precautions have been so lax as to permit hostile troops to come right into our compound and destroy our airplanes and kill and wound our men.

Another point deserving explanation is the oversimplification of the problem by Secretary McNamara in his news conference yesterday. The distinct impression was given that a group of North Vietnamese soldiers crept down the Ho Chi Minh trail in the dead of night, went through our defenses, killed and wounded our men, destroyed our airplanes, and returned to North Vietnam unscathed. With such a simple explanation, it then becomes easy to say that, tit for tat, we attacked North Vietnamese bases in southern North Vietnam. But things are not quite that simple, judging from later reports. Was this entirely a North Vietnamese raid—where were the Vietcong, whose supposedly friendly villages were used as the staging area for the attack? Was this entirely a North Vietnamese raid or was it the usual Vietcong raid, as at Bien Hoa, which again caught us with our britches down?

The basic fact remains that we have no business in South Vietnam. We cannot "advise" a war weary people such as the South Vietnamese how to fight when they have no desire to fight.

Let us suppose that we do escalate the war in South Vietnam by destroying all of North Vietnam and subjugating its people. We would still be left with South Vietnam where a civil war would still continue to rage. If then we militarily subjugated all of South Vietnam, where would the United States be? We would have two colonies, ruled by military might far into the future, with the hatred of the peoples of both colonies against the United States growing stronger by the day—and a ghastly necrology of young American lives lost and a staggering financial cost which will totally undo all of President Johnson's economy efforts.

We cannot instill love and respect and support in the people of South Vietnam for their government in Saigon by brute, military force.

I have said before and I say again: the war in South Vietnam should be brought to the conference table and the sooner that is done the better will be the U.S. stature not only in South Vietnam but in the entire free world.

The New York Times, this morning, said in its lead editorial:

Each incident like Pleiku, each political crisis, each month that passes, increases the danger to us to southeast Asia and to the world. The strike at North Vietnam was understandable and justifiable as a tactical response in a war situation. It was not a substitute for a policy. There was an exchange of blows which left the Vietnamese situation in status quo. What the Johnson administration now has to explain is where we go from here.

The observations in the New York Times editorial were most cogent and I ask unanimous consent that the entire

editorial from today's New York Times be inserted in the *CONGRESSIONAL RECORD* at the conclusion of my remarks.

There is also an interesting article in the New York Times this morning by Charles Mohr entitled "Questions on Air Strike—Explanations of Events Behind Action Leave a Number of Points Unresolved." Mr. Mohr raises questions about what happened in South Vietnam which the American people have a right to have answered. I ask unanimous consent that Mr. Mohr's article also be printed in the *Record* at the conclusion of my remarks.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit No. 2.)

EXHIBIT 1

[From the *Progressive*, February 1965]

VIETNAM: A STUDY IN DECEPTION

(By James A. Wechsler)

Diplomats and historians will one day offer their considered assessment of the war in Vietnam and the role of the United States in that conflict. The verdict, like so many postmortems, will hinge in large measure on how the story ends, and in the early days of January 1965, when these lines are written, the fog of uncertainty remains thick. If, for example, the conflict should terminate with the beginning of broad negotiations for an Asian detente and the initiation of meaningful discourse between Washington and Peking, the American policymakers may emerge with larger distinction than now seems likely; it may well be argued in retrospect that only prolongation of the long, desperate stalemate paved the way for such an outcome. Other, far more ominous alternatives still confront us, including, of course, the most awesome peril that we will stumble into large-scale collision with Red China on this bleak terrain—surely the most intolerable example of "the wrong war in the wrong place at the wrong time."

But whatever place the Vietnam involvement may occupy in our military annals, it has already become a classic case-history in the uses—and misuses—of Government deception to sustain a course that deserved the fullest national awareness and debate. In fact, from Saigon to Washington, there has been a war within a war—a conflict between a small, gallant band of journalists who conceived it their first function to tell the country the truth, and certain elder statesmen of the press who had voluntarily assumed the role of advance men for influential voices in the Pentagon and the State Department.

If much of the country has suffered a sense of bewilderment and frustration over the Vietnam deadlock, it is not merely because our "illusion of omnipotence" has been shattered anew. It is because we have been subjected to an almost unsurpassed compound of misinformation and wishful thinking. This was not always the product of diabolical deceit; there have no doubt been many moments when some of the sources of befuddlement were merely articulating their own confusion or ignorance.

But the total effect has been scandalous. I do not happen to be one of those who lightly raise the cry of "managed news"; 2 years ago, in this magazine, I defended President Kennedy's resort to concealment in certain crucial hours preceding the Cuban confrontation. At the same time I also wrote that much of the press too often achieved maximum indignation over marginal issues and that it had been singularly lacking in outrage over the fashion in which the more diligent U.S. correspondents were being pushed around in South Vietnam. There has been mounting documentation of that story in the ensuing period; it is part of a

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larger saga of suppression and distortion in which eminent Americans have been no less guilty than Mme. Nhu and the minor Machiavellis who succeeded her.

Reference to a most recent episode may be a proper prelude. On December 28, at a moment of new turmoil in the Saigon regime, two large New York newspapers (and no doubt many others throughout the Nation) carried almost identical headlines: "Great Victory in South Vietnam." The phrase "great victory" was exactly the one jointly employed by United States and Vietnamese officials in describing the capture of a Vietcong headquarters and the killing of some 90 of the Communist troops. The ordinary citizen, unless he had been rendered cynical by a surfeit of similar great victories prematurely heralded, was clearly being invited to believe that the tide had turned dramatically.

Exactly 1 week after this inflated depiction of a small success came the dismal anticlimax. From Burgh Gia the United Press International reported that "a major defeat for the South Vietnamese Government's forces became apparent today as fighting subsided here after 6 days." 'Twas indeed a famous victory that preceded this debacle.

Yet on the same day that this gloomy acknowledgment arrived, Secretary of State Dean Rusk blandly announced on television that he remained serenely confident of the ultimate victory of the Vietnamese without any expansion of the conflict.

Meanwhile, President Johnson has on at least two occasions during this recent period of agonized paralysis chided the press for "speculation" about the possibility of expanding the war. I am entirely convinced that Mr. Johnson has resisted such proposals; but any newspaperman over 21 knows these stories were planted by men within his own administration—in the Pentagon and elsewhere—who have been pressing for such action, and who believed the publication of such dispatches might somehow force the President's hand. The existence of such a cabal should hardly be suppressed, or dismissed as journalistic fantasy.

In miniature these episodes were, one might say, the story of the war as it has been officially presented to the Nation: small triumphs, sharp reversals, and, most of all, sugary reassurances.

Thus, on April 6, 1962, Gen. Paul D. Harkins, chief of the U.S. military command in Saigon, was cheerfully observing that "Premier Ngo Dinh Diem has adopted two concepts of major importance in the struggle against the Communist guerrillas." The general said "the Vietnamese forces have seized the initiative" and that the Vietcong, having been rebuffed in "large attacks," had reverted to small units.

Early in July of the same year an Associated Press dispatch from Fort Leavenworth, Kans., based on interviews with U.S. officers recently returned from Vietnam, said they found military operations in South Vietnam "confused and ineffective."

This somber report evoked instant counterfire. Gen. George H. Decker, U.S. Army Chief of Staff, said such opinion did not "accurately reflect the opinions of responsible Army authorities in Washington or in the field." Simultaneously, according to an Associated Press dispatch from Washington, "Dean Rusk, in a TV interview, also denied that the Vietnam war was going badly."

On July 24, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, returning from a Pacific conference, said he was "encouraged over the progress of affairs in South Vietnam" but conceded that the struggle there might last "4 years." He said the South Vietnamese are "beginning to hit the Vietcong where it hurts most—in winning the people to the side of

the Government," and added: "Our military assistance to Vietnam is paying off."

Now we arrive at May 1963. The Vietcong legions have stepped up their attacks. Senators Barry Goldwater and Stuart Symington have joined in a call for U.S. air strikes against North Vietnam. Senator Mike Mansfield (who has remained steadfastly sober throughout the Vietnam madness, and was one of the first to urge efforts to achieve a negotiated settlement) warns that such action would invite a larger version of Korea "paid for primarily with American lives."

Meanwhile, according to a dispatch to the New York Herald Tribune, "experts at the State and Defense Departments said the Vietcong were engaged in a desperate effort to recapture the initiative * * *"

In September occurred the painful Sylvester affair. Arthur Sylvester, formerly an able Washington correspondent and now Assistant Secretary of Defense in charge of public relations, had accompanied McNamara and Gen. Maxwell Taylor on a tour of inspection to Saigon. Within 24 hours of their arrival, Sylvester told correspondents that the war was "going well" and that the moment was "rapidly approaching where goals set will be reached relatively shortly." But not many days earlier President Kennedy had voiced concern that the war was being undermined by internal strife in the Diem regime. Moreover, correspondents on the scene presented statistics to Sylvester which disclosed that during the first half of 1963 there had been a decline in guerrilla casualties and loss of weapons and a corresponding increase in Government casualties.

Sylvester, a conscientious, thoughtful man who has had the unenviable mission of trying to speak coherently amid all the conflicting clamor, finally conceded that his previously optimistic briefings might have "tended to throw things out of focus." He said they were apparently viewed as "tending to suggest I was trying to plaster things over with a pretty look." In fact, he declared, he had merely been reporting what General Harkins had told McNamara.

By autumn of 1963 it became clear that all the effort invested in saving the face of the Diem regime had been a futile endeavor. Madame Nhu's frenetic attack on "U.S. junior officers" helped to hasten the day of the Diems' overthrow. By November, the coup d'etat—plainly promoted by Washington—had occurred.

In the aftermath of the coup, Max Frankel reported in the New York Times that the administration anticipated "greater progress in the war against the Communist guerrillas." He added:

"Administration leaders are confident that a new civilian government could quickly restore order in Saigon and turn its attentions back to the war effort. They believe the ouster of President Ngo Dinh Diem, of his brother and principal political adviser, Ngo Dinh Nhu, and of only a few of their principal adherents will bring an end to internal repression and recurrent political turmoil."

Gen. Dvong Van Minh, the new military ruler of South Vietnam, exuded positive thinking.

"We made this coup to win the war," he proclaimed in an interview. "We realize that the Diem regime had lost the confidence of the population, and you cannot win a war without the support of the population."

New songs of hope officially emanated from Saigon and Washington. In this as in other matters, there was essential continuity between the Kennedy and the Johnson administrations.

As 1963 drew to an end, General Harkins was reiterating his confidence that, by the end of 1965, the United States would be able to pull out most of its own forces and permit the Vietnamese to finish the mop-up

operation. Defense Secretary McNamara had been persuaded to embrace Harkins' wistful forecast.

As usual there were contradictory sounds. Even as Harkins was reaffirming his prophesy, a Washington dispatch to the New York Times reported that "officials at the State Department are less inclined than in the past to place optimistic interpretations on day-by-day combat reports."

One year later, at the close of 1964, the cycle was sadly completed. After another year of feverish fluctuation in the statements of public officials and Vietnamese generals, a new coup had in effect taken place; the military had wiped out any semblance of constitutional rule and the United States found itself in the awkward position of imploring a restoration of the fragile status quo.

This bare outline of history is recited because it provides the essential background against which the journalistic war must be weighed.

The truth is that, almost from the moment of the U.S. commitment to defend South Vietnam, dedicated, responsible newspapermen began striving to break through the curtain of oversimplification. Those who did so quickly became the targets of Madame Nhu and her entourage; they also found themselves embroiled with U.S. officialdom and, in some cases, with their home offices and some of the pillars of the fourth estate.

The first clear portent was the ouster of Francois Sully of Newsweek. A veteran southeast Asia observer, he was guilty of lack of reverence for Mme. Nhu. Soon thereafter came the exiling of James Robinson of the National Broadcasting Co., for comparable heresy. Both episodes stirred far too little notice in the country.

They were not isolated incidents; they were symptomatic of an underlying tension between inquisitive newsmen and the Saigon Establishment (Vietnamese and American). David Halberstam, of the New York Times, writing recently in the magazine Commentary, summed it up this way:

"The job of reporters in Vietnam was to report the news, whether or not the news was good for America."

"To the ambassadors and generals, on the other hand, it was crucial that the news be good, and they regarded any other interpretation as defeatist and irresponsible."

Halberstam himself soon became a "controversial figure." He was one of the younger journalists who refused to accept the official versions; he was dismayed by the stream of military and political dignitaries who junketed to the area, went on conducted tours, and returned to the United States proclaiming that victory was on the horizon. Correspondents would read such stuff under Washington datelines, Halberstam noted, and then return to the field and "see the same tired old government tactics, the same hack political commanders in charge, the same waste of human resources."

To other troubleshooters were Charles Mohr and Mort Perry of Time magazine. They, too, found little substance for the good news periodically being sponsored by those who were the makers or mouthpieces of official policy. But back in their home office there were men who professed to be able to see things more clearly. Time's press section carried a harsh diatribe (reportedly dictated by the managing editor) against Saigon reports who engaged in crusading—meaning that they tried to write what they saw, rather than what Saigon and Washington preferred to see in print.

Finally, Mohr and his colleague, in 1963, filed a comprehensive report which began: "The war in Vietnam is being lost." As re-drafted in New York, it became a highly favorable estimate of the grand fighting

spirit of the Vietnamese troops. They resigned.

Halberstam's experience with the New York Times was exactly the reverse; it is also a painful episode in the chronicles of the Kennedy administration. When Arthur Ochs Sulzberger, then the new publisher of the Times, paid a courtesy call on President Kennedy in the fall of 1963, the President asked whether there was any prospect of Halberstam's early transfer. He suggested that this able young man might have become "too involved" in the Saigon story. Sulzberger replied that the Times was entirely satisfied with his coverage, and canceled Halberstam's imminent vacation lest it be construed as a capitulation. The incident was not one of Mr. Kennedy's better moments; but it expressed a state of mind not confined to the White House.

At many moments of setback on the Vietnamese front, there has been a persistent tendency to make skeptical journalists the villains of the drama. Homer Bigart, who preceded Halberstam, suffered similar reproach.

Sadly enough, some of the most articulate spokesmen of this attack were themselves journalists who intermittently visited Saigon—Joseph Alsop, Frank Conniff, and Marguerite Higgins. At various intervals they reported that certain idealistic but untutored young men were offering a "defeatist" view of the war that was somehow infecting the atmosphere.

On the surface the theory seemed somewhat implausible since the circulation of the New York Times among the masses of Vietnamese peasants is limited. Perhaps the more serious contention was that the capricious, tender-spirited rulers of the land could be induced to larger effort if we maintained the pretense that they were giving their all and that their deeds were being crowned with daily success. Plainly this was the judgment of some U.S. emissaries there, but it should hardly have been used as a yardstick of journalistic virtue.

Regardless of how the story ends, events have abundantly and repeatedly vindicated the gloomy crusaders. Neither Diem nor this military clique that succeeded him has shown any capacity for effective popular leadership or for carrying out those reforms that might give the populace some sense that it had a true stake in the war.

Indeed, those who had led us to believe in 1963 that Halberstam and his associates were being unduly pessimistic were tacitly conceding, by the end of 1964, how right he had been. Led by Joseph Alsop, they were clamoring for large-scale U.S. intervention to rescue Saigon's chaotic regime. (The alternative, wrote Alsop, is "the most humiliating defeat" in our national history.) Surely that desperate predicament could not be attributed to any underestimation of Vietnamese strength voiced by the heretic correspondents.

It seems to me that the clearest clue to the agony of South Vietnam—and the point that the harassed journalists have been steadily trying to make—was contained in a dispatch from Robert Keatly, the Wall Street Journal's man in Saigon, published on June 15, 1964, which began:

"Long An province, just southwest of Saigon, is potentially a rich area. Its fertile land produces quantities of rice and fruit, and large numbers of the white Peking ducks so highly favored in Vietnamese cuisine are raised locally.

"But prosperity hasn't touched most of the province's 300,000 inhabitants. Many live on small plots of rented land and pay 50 percent or 75 percent of their crops to landlords. Most do without electricity and running water.

"A hired fieldhand earns 70 cents a day if he can work. Two young girls spend a long

day weaving three fiber mats on a crude hand loom, dividing wages of only 50 cents between them."

Most American observers in South Vietnam, Keatly added, agreed the Saigon regime could wage effective military action against the Communists only if it wins the loyalty and confidence of the people of the Vietnamese countryside; it could do so only by providing dramatic improvements in drab, substandard living conditions. So far, he said, there was no sign of a new day; many decades of bungling, graft, and indifference in high places had created a profound skepticism about vigorous new programs such as those proclaimed by the new regime of General Khanh.

And time, he warned, was running out. "If these programs don't show measurable progress this year," a U.S. official was quoted as saying, "the whole war effort could be washed out from beneath us."

That was June 1964.

Certainly there has been an honorable American attempt, under both Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, to convey the warnings to Saigon's elite. But the message has never been truly heard. Perhaps it might have been more audible if less time had been spent in seeking, between the intermittent moments of truth, to blur the hard facts of life.

I have never doubted President Johnson's (or Kennedy's) earnest desire to end this war on honorable terms, and to avoid reckless "escalation." Some of the mischievous propaganda circulated in various U.S. organs of the new pro-Chinese left is as unjust and as unrelated to reality as the monolithic mystique of the Muscovites of the 1930's. But neither do I believe there can be any sane solution if we are ourselves unwilling to confront unpleasant truth and to recognize that the game, as we have played it so far in Vietnam, may be nearly up. Beyond that, the lesson of these matters is that all of our psychological warfare, geared to promoting the notion that things are usually better than they seem, has singularly failed to deceive the enemy; it has merely augmented our own confusion, and delayed too long the airing of our real dilemma. Our bargaining position might have been far better 2 years ago if we had recognized what Halberstam and others attempted to tell us. It may be even worse a year from now if we continue this process of self-deception and perpetuate the legend that time and providence are necessarily on our side.

EXHIBIT 2

[From the New York Times, Feb. 8, 1965]

TIT FOR TAT IN VIETNAM

The American position in the strikes against North Vietnam has been stated clearly by President Johnson, Secretary McNamara, and Under Secretary Ball. It is that the Vietcong attack on Pleiku, with its bloody toll in American dead and wounded, represented a test of American political will and purpose, to which "we could not fail to respond." Washington emphasizes that the United States "does not strive to expand the war."

The difficulty is that Hanoi may now adopt exactly the same logic and treat the American strike as a challenge to its will and purpose. Pelping and Moscow, whose Premier Kossygin was in North Vietnam's capital at the time, may also take it as a provocation directed at them. Perhaps the very fact of Mr. Kossygin's presence was why Hanoi chose to make its raid. Yet, the retaliation that raid has brought makes it a matter of prestige for the Russians to help Hanoi. To that extent it tends to bring Russia and China into tactical partnership.

In Vietnam the United States is engaged in a war. In any war, attacks are made and men are killed and wounded. The other

side is impelled to strike back even harder, and so try to discourage further attacks. The process, inescapably, is one of escalation. As such a war continues, it becomes bigger, costlier, more dangerous. Vietnam is proving no exception.

The average American will not question that if the Vietcong hits the Americans, our forces must hit back. But many will wonder why we are fighting a war on the other side of the globe for a people who permit our soldiers to be killed without lifting a warning voice. As in the attack at Bien Hoa airbase 2 months ago when so many American planes were destroyed, the Vietnamese villagers either collaborated with the Vietcong or refused to help the Americans and the Saigon Government.

Each incident like Pleiku, each political crisis, each month that passes, increases the danger to us, to southeast Asia, and to the world. The strike at North Vietnam was understandable and justifiable as a tactical response in a war situation. It was not a substitute for a policy. There was an exchange of blows which left the Vietnamese situation in status quo. What the Johnson administration now has to explain is where we go from here.

[From the New York Times, Feb. 8, 1965]

QUESTIONS ON AIR STRIKE—EXPLANATIONS OF EVENTS BEHIND ACTION LEAVE A NUMBER OF POINTS UNRESOLVED

(By Charles Mohr)

WASHINGTON, February 7.—The official explanations of the events surrounding the American air strike on North Vietnam have left a number of important questions unanswered.

The United States attacked in retaliation for the costly night raid on American troops and helicopters at Pleiku in central Vietnam by Communist guerrilla forces.

Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara expressed today the general opinion of the Johnson administration when he said of the attack on Pleiku that it was "quite clear this was a test of the will and challenge of purpose" of the United States and South Vietnam.

Government sources privy to the discussions that led to the U.S. attack say it was felt that North Vietnam had clearly directed and "made possible" the raid on Pleiku.

THE WEAPONS FACTOR

One question involves the weapons used by the attacking Vietcong unit. The heaviest were American-made 81-millimeter mortars.

American military advisers in Vietnam have long conceded that the majority of Vietcong weapons are American-made ones captured in battle from South Vietnamese forces.

The question is, therefore, that if the Vietcong unit at Pleiku was—as is so often the case—using captured weapons, would this sustain the argument that North Vietnam made possible this particular attack?

Administration sources also contend that the size and intensity of the attack indicated that it was a major blow carefully timed by Hanoi. Yet reports from the field indicate that a company—or less—of Vietcong troops took part in the bloody but brief encounter.

This is not a large Vietcong assault. Many are much larger, involving hundreds of attacking guerrillas.

There were American casualties, but the attack was not especially intense. On a number of occasions whole South Vietnamese infantry units up to company size have been wiped out by the Vietcong in night assaults.

Another factor advanced by Government sources is a belief that attacks launched the same night at Tuy Hoa and a group of villages near Nha Trang indicated, by the number and coordination of assaults in a single

night, a pattern of overall direction, probably from Hanoi.

Since larger numbers of Vietcong attacks have taken place throughout South Vietnam on other nights, it is asked, Why would this be?

Secretary McNamara was asked at his news conference whether the perimeter defense of the installations at Pleiku had been deficient in view of the enemy success.

He said he did not believe "it would ever be possible to protect our forces against a sneak attack of that kind" and added that the mortars had been fired from a considerable distance and that clumps of foliage on the generally open plateau had offered cover.

Reports from Pleiku, however, later established that the Vietcong attackers had been able to crawl right onto the U.S. helicopter base to place explosive charges against barracks' walls and on the airstrip.

A question raised was whether South Vietnamese security troops were ignoring long-standing American advice to increase night patrolling.

Still another question puzzling to some in Washington is why all three attack carriers of the U.S. 7th Fleet were in the South China Sea near the Vietnamese coast at the same time.

The usual pattern is one of dispersal, with each carrier forming the nucleus of an attack force operating off different parts of east Asia.

EFFECT IS QUERIED

A further question was whether the air attacks on North Vietnam would weaken the Vietcong guerrillas tactically or strategically and prevent further Vietcong successes against American installations.

The administration contention clearly is that North Vietnam made possible the attack on Pleiku. But the questions about the incident grow out of the apparent fact that a small Vietcong unit, armed with captured weapons and protected by a lack of field intelligence on the part of the South Vietnamese Army, succeeded in creeping onto the American base and dealing a bloody blow.

Thus, the final question is how much of the responsibility for Pleiku can be held not just to Hanoi but to a failure to prosecute the antiguerrilla war in South Vietnam itself in a more vigorous and successful way.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER. What is the will of the Senate?

MR. CLARK. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

MR. CLARK. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

MR. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, I should like to reply—or rather to express myself briefly—with relation to what the Senator from Alaska [Mr. Gruening], I am told, has said about our situation in South Vietnam. Certainly, no one regrets the present situation more than I do. But it is very true and fundamental, in my opinion, that the prestige of the United States, the whole security of our country, and the whole future of our situation in the Far East depends upon our retaliating quickly and speedily when a U.S. compound is at-

tacked and our men and our airplanes are destroyed. If we take that action lying down, our future in that whole area of the world will be affected adversely.

Without going into any lengthy discussion at the present time, I wish to say that I intend to support the President and the Secretary of Defense in any responsible decisions—and I say they all will be responsible decisions—to retaliate when situations like the present one arise.

What the final determination will be we cannot say at this time. I for one know only what the Secretary of Defense has said, and what I have read in the newspapers. It seems to me fundamental to state that we are in Vietnam, and must maintain our prestige and the strength of our forces there in order to preserve what we stand for. We cannot take an attack lying down and have men in the uniform of our country killed and wounded without letting our enemies know that anyone responsible for such action will meet with swift retaliation. That is what we have done in the present instance. I hope that we shall always retaliate and not allow our boys in uniform to be killed, and take it lying down. That is all I care to say at the present moment.

MR. CLARK. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

MR. SALTONSTALL. I yield to the Senator from Pennsylvania.

MR. CLARK. I commend the Senator from Massachusetts for rising in support of the Johnson administration in his usual broadminded and bipartisan way when a serious question of foreign policy arises.

I suppose I am as discontented with the present situation in Vietnam as is the Senator from Massachusetts. I know perhaps less about the situation than does he as a member of the Committee on Armed Services. But I believe that this is no time to attack the present administration on the floor of the Senate before we have far more information about the background of the raids over the weekend and the retaliation which the President, in his capacity as the Commander in Chief of our Armed Forces, has ordered. I for one am prepared to give the administration the benefit of the doubt until I know far more about the situation than I know at the present time.

As the acting majority leader, I again thank the Senator from Massachusetts, for his patriotic comments in support of what our President has done.

MR. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, I appreciate what the distinguished Senator from Pennsylvania has said. It seems to me fundamental that it is the only position we can honorably take at the present time.

CUBAN CRISIS COMPARED WITH VIETNAM

MR. MILLER. Mr. President, in this morning's edition of the Washington Post appears an article by the distinguished columnist, Mr. Joseph Alsop, entitled "We Can Versus We Can't,"

which I believe merits the attention of readers of the RECORD. I have a great respect for Mr. Alsop's opinions, particularly when they relate to the Far East.

However, in the course of his article Mr. Alsop refers to a ratio or a percentage of risk, that we may have weighed in the balance during the Cuban missile crisis.

My comment on this point is not "the rear view" to which he refers in his article, but rather is a comment I made at the very time of the Cuban missile crisis. I stated that I thought that President Kennedy was making the right decision, but I did not think that the possibility of a nuclear war, much less an all-out nuclear war, was very great.

The reason I made that statement then and the reason I repeat it now, is that I did not think Mr. Khrushchev was anywhere near committing suicide. It is unfortunate that Mr. Alsop's otherwise very splendid article should be possibly reduced in its value by an argument over the responsibilities. Nevertheless, I think that the possibilities should be discussed.

I do not agree with Mr. Alsop's view on this particular point, although I do agree with some of his other views.

In connection with this point, there is also an article in the February issue of the Reader's Digest entitled "We Must Stop Red China Now," containing a question-and-answer series involving Dr. William E. Griffith, an outstanding authority on communism. I believe that a reading of that article, coupled with Mr. Alsop's article, might do much to clear the air with respect to where we ought to be going in South Vietnam. I ask unanimous consent that the two articles to which I have referred be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the articles were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Washington Post, Feb. 8, 1965]

"WE CAN" VERSUS "WE CAN'T"

(By Joseph Alsop)

Not long after the Cuban missile crisis in October 1962, President Kennedy was reminiscing about this supreme event of his administration.

It all seemed easy enough, he remarked, after the Soviet bluff had been successfully called, but the trouble was no one could be sure, at the outset, that the Soviets really were bluffing.

He was asked what he had thought the odds were, at the outset, that the Soviets were not bluffing. He replied that he had thought the chance that the Soviets meant to go through to the end was somewhere between 1 in 3 and even odds.

It was a chilling thing to hear. For if the Soviets had not been bluffing, the Cuban missile crisis would almost certainly have ended in what the military theorists sweetly call a thermonuclear exchange. And the current Pentagon estimate of the cost to this country of a H-bomb attack is 110 million dead Americans.

In short, President Kennedy very sharply changed the course of history by consciously risking the destruction of 60 percent of the population of the United States when the risk was at least as high as 1 in 3 in his sober, carefully considered opinion. He was helped, no doubt, because he was also conscious that if he submitted to the threat of Soviet missiles in Cuba, most of the people

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whom he led and loved would never forgive such a surrender.

Every thinking person is grateful, today, for the dead President's willingness to run this fearful risk. Many are perhaps unaware of the Pentagon price tag above quoted. Many may believe, with the easy wisdom of the rear view, that the risk was not really "1 in 3."

But no thinking person can suppose there was no risk at all that the Kremlin would refuse to back down in October 1962. And no thinking person can suppose that the thing risked—an H-bomb attack—would have been anything but unimaginably awful. All the same, there is unanimity that Mr. Kennedy did right.

These facts provide the context in which to judge the sharp turn that events have taken in the last 48 hours. As these words are written, it is not known whether the President has merely ordered another demonstration, like the one after the trouble in the Gulf of Tonkin; or whether he has at last decided to do whatever may be needed to avert defeat in South Vietnam.

It is not known, in other words, whether he has finally decided to act upon the advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and his Ambassador in Saigon, Gen. Maxwell Taylor. But whether this is another fruitless one-shot stunt, or whether the President now means business at last, it is worth fitting the reason for his long indecision into the context already provided above.

Previously he has rejected the Joint Chiefs' advice and has done less than Maxwell Taylor wanted done, even at the time of the Gulf of Tonkin, for a basically simple reason. When each successive plan for sterner action against the North Vietnamese aggressors has been presented to the President, he has asked for absolute guarantees that such action would not lead to "another Korea." And the guarantees have not been given, because they could not be given with honesty.

The memory of the proudest episode in this country's proud postwar history as burden-bearer of the free world has in fact paralyzed our highest councils instead of inspiring them.

The practical political reasons why this has happened—the narrow murmurings of Senator RICHARD RUSSELL, the President's own memories of the opposition's squalid post-Korea behavior, and so on and on—hardly need emphasis.

What needs emphasis is the bizarre lunacy of the people who insist we can quite properly do what we did in October 1962 whereas we cannot again do what we did in Korea. The figures speak for themselves. In October 1962 President Kennedy took a substantial risk of 110 million casualties in this country. The Korean war was hard and cruel as well as proud, but it cost us, in dead and wounded, only 137,000 casualties.

Those men fell to defend all that had been defended and gained for their country by those who fell at Tarawa, Iwo Jima, Guadalcanal, and Saipan—who also numbered less than 300,000. Where then is our common-sense, that we shrink and fall back, and shrink and fall back until the lives of millions must again be risked?

We have waited overlong. With Kossygin at Hanoi, the danger is far greater than it was not so very long ago. But the choice is the same, and the figures are the same, and the price of failure is the same.

[From the Reader's Digest, February 1965]

WE MUST STOP RED CHINA NOW

An apprehensive shudder traveled through the free world last fall when Red China exploded its first nuclear device. Since then, the Chinese have become increasingly belligerent in sensitive areas around the globe. How should the United States and its allies respond to this new and menacing offensive?

In this interview, conducted by the editors of The Reader's Digest, Dr. William E. Griffith, an outstanding authority on communism, offers a series of specific proposals designed to contain the strengthened Chinese influence. Dr. Griffith is director of the International Communism Project at the MIT Center for International Studies. He is also professor of Soviet diplomacy in the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, and author of "The Sino-Soviet Rift.")

Question. Dr. Griffith, what is the significance of Red China's explosion of a nuclear device?

Answer. To the Chinese people, and to many others throughout the world, the device is proof that Red China now has the essential element of becoming an independent power—atomic capacity. The political effect of this is already apparent. More and more people, even in India and Japan, are beginning to think that the wave of the future, at least in areas like southeast Asia, is not red, white and blue, but yellow.

China is the first underdeveloped country the first Asian country and the first colored country that has produced an atomic bomb. There is no question that the Chinese are highly proud of this achievement and now realize that all the privations have not been in vain. If they don't have butter, at least they do have a very big gun.

From our point of view, the most alarming aspect is the type of device that was exploded. The official statement of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission indicates that the Chinese used uranium 235, very likely produced in a gaseous-diffusion plant. This is an enormously expensive operation, involving tremendous amounts of electric power, and it indicates that Chinese technology and engineering may be much more advanced than we had thought. Moreover, the fact that the Chinese have uranium 235 indicates that they will be able to get an H-bomb much more rapidly than had been thought—probably within 2 or 3 years.

For the present at least, one should think fundamentally of the Chinese nuclear device as a political advantage, rather than a military gain. Red China still lacks an effective delivery system for the A-bomb. There is no reason, however, to suppose that the Chinese cannot eventually develop one.

Question. Apart from the bomb, have the Chinese been doing well in extending their influence?

Answer. The Chinese are dizzy with success. They were the greatest winners from the fall of Khrushchev. In Asia the Chinese now have primary influence over the North Vietnamese. By supporting the North Koreans in the Korean war, they have won primary influence over North Korea, and the Russians have lost it. They have drawn Cambodia and Burma into their orbit. They defeated the Indians humiliatingly and disastrously in November 1962. They have isolated the Indians from all the other southeast Asian powers, which are now so frightened by Red China that they are in the process of trying to come to terms with Peiping. The Chinese have tremendous sway over the Indonesians. And Chinese influence even extends into Europe, for Albania is virtually a Chinese satellite.

Question. What do these successes mean in terms of China's role in world affairs?

Answer. The rise of Red China presents an entirely new situation in the world balance of power. China is a revolutionary power with global ambitions. It is determined to replace Moscow at the head of what the Chinese would consider a completely purified and revolutionary world Communist movement.

The Chinese think that the wave of victory which they are riding will engulf the underdeveloped countries, particularly those in

the Southern Hemisphere, where people who are both poor and colored resent the wealthy white countries, including Russia. China counts on the frustrations, the weakness, and the fear of the colored peoples of the world to drive them into Peiping's control. That is why they are working so hard—and effectively—in Africa and Latin America.

Question. How, exactly, do the Chinese operate in these areas?

Answer. They have various weapons. Their first weapon is money—they are spending hundreds of millions of dollars a year on their worldwide operations. In Latin America the Chinese have encouraged Castro to support the guerrillas in Venezuela. They have allied with him in a struggle to win supremacy over Latin American communism and, in the process, to depose the pro-Soviet heads of the big Latin American Communist Parties—in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile. They do not have diplomatic missions in Latin America, but they frequently use their news agency offices—the New China News Agency—as their base for subversion and bribery.

The Chinese carry on an immense propaganda operation, not only with very extensive broadcasts, but also with an immense amount of literature. They publish their magazines and articles in about 15 languages and spread them around the world with no thought of cost. These things are very well done, and there is no question that they have some influence. At the University of Caracas in Venezuela, for example, you don't see Russian literature, you don't see American literature—you see Chinese literature, in impeccable Spanish. It is tailor-made for the young, the radical, the violent, the dissatisfied, the frustrated.

In Africa, the Chinese think they have great chances, because they feel the future there holds more turmoil, more tribal and ethnic warfare, and more anarchy and chaos—the kind of violence which they have only to urge on. For this reason they have aided the revolutionaries in Zanzibar, the rebels in the Congo. They are trying to buy up, to influence and to give training and political and ideological direction to the dissatisfied, frustrated radicals in all countries of black Africa.

Question. China is doing all this, and yet, internally, it is a weak country?

Answer. Yes. This is the most remarkable aspect of its achievements. Not only is it a weak country with an enormous population growth, but it has probably become weaker in the last 5 years. China was hard hit when the Russians took back all their technical experts and stopped all economic aid in 1960. The stagnation of Chinese industry in the last 5 years is almost unparalleled in any Communist country. Furthermore, the Chinese ran into a series of very bad harvests. They've been buying the wheat surpluses of Canada and Australia for some years now; only in this way have they been able to keep going in the food sector.

One must remember, however, that throughout history China has always had immense problems arising from its tremendous population, from recurrent bad harvests and floods of its great rivers. The Communist Government, if nothing else, has produced a degree of discipline which prevents wholesale catastrophe; even at the worst of the economic crisis in 1960-61, there was no mass starvation in China.

The Chinese seem for the present to be concentrating primarily on agriculture. Given their population problems, they probably can do little else. The population of China is estimated to be somewhere around 650 to 700 million, and estimates of the rate of population increase have ranged as high as 25 million a year. This explains their interest in southeast Asia, which is traditionally a great rice-producing area.